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Regulations, governance, and resolution of non-performing loan: Evidence 









How do banks resolve a severe bad loan problem in a capital-constrained, low-income economy 
when a government bailout is not an option? We address this question by examining new evidence 
of a sharp decline in bad loan ratios in a panel of conventional commercial banks in Bangladesh.  
On the aggregate level, the bad loan ratio in this market has dropped from 41% in 1999 to only 
10.0% in 2012. We find that at a micro-level this dramatic improvement is associated with bank 
management quality and internal governance that were substantially enhanced during a decade of 
large-scale regulatory reforms. The bank-level findings persist even after controlling for market 
monitoring, bank- and industry-level factors and macroeconomic variables. Both economic growth 
and financial development paved the way for the banks operating in this macroeconomic 
environment to reduce NPL over time.  
 
 


























Regulations, governance, and resolution of non-performing loan: Evidence 
from an emerging economy 
1. Introduction 
Dealing with sizable nonperforming loans (henceforth NPL) is an old and pervasive issue 
for many developing economies. As an aftermath of the financial crisis, however, the loan portfolio 
quality concerns became equally relevant to more advanced banking markets. The unresolved bad 
debts put pressure on the banks’ balance sheets, earnings, and capital adequacy and, from a system-
wide perspective, undermine banking sectors’ stability, restrict credit supply and slow down 
overall economic growth and post-crisis recovery. This paper provides evidence on the resolution 
of bad loan problems when a government bailout was not available for the banks.    
There is now vast literature documenting causes and consequences of the NPL problem. 
On the macro-level, the role of adverse economic conditions, lax underwriting standards during 
the preceding lending booms, weak banking regulation and supervision, inadequate corporate 
governance and poor incentives for the market monitoring1 are found to be major determinants of 
non-performing loans.  On the bank-level, the NPL accumulation can be explained by such factors 
as bank ownership structure (Shehzad et al., 2010; Saunders et al., 1990; Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Chalermchatvichien et al., 2013), management quality (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Espinoza and 
Prasad, 2010; Fofack, 2005); previous growth in the loan portfolios (Foos et al., 2009; Keeton and 
Morris, 1987) and bank capital position (Sinkey and Greenawalt, 1991). Salas and Saurina (2002) 
and Louzis et al. (2012) provide strong evidence of the interplay of macroeconomic and bank level 
variables in determining problem loans.2 
                                                 
1 See Barth et al. (2004) for a summary Aysan et al. (2015) for emerging markets. 
 
2 Specially for an emerging market context, lax underwriting standards, unsophisticated credit risk management, poor 
regulatory discipline and regulatory forbearance (Barth et al., 2004),  poor incentives for the market monitoring, 
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At the same time, the factors behind a successful resolution of a severe bad loan problem, 
especially at the bank level, remain largely unexplored. Klingebiel (2000) and Dado and Klingebiel 
(2000) describe two alternative approaches to the NPL resolution in a distressed banking sector – 
a stock approach and a flow approach. In the stock approach, the responsibility for the bad debts 
resolution is assumed by a private or public asset management company (AMC) and/or a bank 
restructuring agency with a mandate to take over the nonperforming assets of distressed banks.3  
In the flow approach, the resolution of accumulated bad loans is left to banks - i.e., the regulators 
rely on the banks’ self-sustained clean-up of their balance sheets. To enhance bank-level incentives 
for the write-down of bad losses, the flow resolution regime is usually accompanied by legal, 
accounting, and/or governance reforms. Although the flow-based NPL resolution offers a 
promising path towards reducing bad debts without direct government bailouts, there are yet no 
empirical studies which attempt to explore its pros and cons with bank-level evidence.   
In this paper, we attempt to identify system-wide and bank-level factors behind the NPL 
resolution and to draw regulatory and bank management lessons by examining the thirteen-year 
experience of successful recovery from massive bad debts in Bangladesh. Indeed, as we show in 
Figure 1, there is a convergence trend between developed and developing economies in the last 
decade. While the ratio of bad loans has dropped significantly in low and lower middle economies, 
it has been on the rise in high-income countries since 2007. Figure 1 also shows that Bangladesh, 
                                                 
inefficient corporate governance, management entrenchment and connected lending (Khwaja et al., 2011), weak 
creditor rights protection (Allen et al., 2012),  government-  and politically-directed lending (Dinc, 2005; Bonin and 
Huang, 2001), opaque borrowers and explosive and unregulated lending booms (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2006) are 
found to be major drivers of non-performing loans. 
 
3For details of cross-country experiences on the stock-based NPL resolution see Bonin and Huang (2001), Claessens 
et al. (1999), Stiglitz and Uy (1996), Fung et al. (2003), and Woo (2000). Most of these papers discuss mixed evidence 
on the AMCs effectiveness in East Asian countries following the Asian financial crisis.  Klingebiel (2000) provides a 
set of case studies for a broader list of developed and developing countries, including Finland, Spain, Sweden, US, 
Ghana, Mexico, and the Philippines. Betz et al. (2016) discuss factors that drive time to resolution of defaulted loans 
in Germany, the UK, and the USA. Overall the resolution process is shorter in Germany than two other countries.     
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a low- income economy, has experienced a spectacular, four-fold drop in the banks’ NPL ratio 
over the same period.  Due to the constraints of the low-income economy, the government of 
Bangladesh could not spend the enormous funds on the clean-up of the NPLs and/or 
recapitalization of local private commercial banks.4 Thus, its rescue measures relied heavily on the 
flow-based resolution strategy. Another feature that makes Bangladesh’s banking sector an 
empirically interesting setting is the massive wave of regulatory reforms during our study period. 
These reforms attempted to enhance banks’ incentives to write-off bad debts and included such 
measures as new minimum capital requirements, stricter loan classification and provisioning 
regimes, corporate governance reforms, promotion of the sound credit risk management practices, 
new disclosure rules, and new channels for market discipline effects.  
We examine the recent Bangladesh experience in the aggressive, regulatory-driven 
resolution of the nonperforming loans problem by using a new, hand-collected dataset for a panel 
of 26 banks over the 2000 – 2012 period.5 We trace the bank-level evolution of the bad loan ratios 
in response to the massive macro-prudential regulation and corporate governance reforms. During 
the study period, the average bank in our sample reduced its gross NPL ratio from 18.5% to 8.2%. 
To explain the evolution of the gross and net (adjusted for loan loss reserves) NPL ratios, we 
construct a panel that tracks the evolution of a broad set of explanatory variables, such as individual 
banks’ financial performance, internal governance, market monitoring, and management quality.  
We also explore the role of macro-level economic development factors. Although the sample size 
is relatively small, the cross-sectional and time-series variation in this study sample is substantial 
                                                 
4We thank the referee for suggesting that even a low-income country can possibly bailout state-owned banks through 
recapitalization. However, during our sample period, we see no anecdotal evidence of baling out of state-owned banks 
by the government. 
 
5 Other studies on non-financial sectors in Bangladesh include Haque et al. (2011) on governance and capital 
structure, Razzaque et al. (2016) on real earnings management, Siddiqui et al. (2013) on audit fee premium, 
Muttakin et al. (2015) on effect of CSR disclosure on earnings quality just to name a few 
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mainly due to the overlapping waves of regulatory shocks to the bank’s internal and external 
governance structures which allow us to detect a robust relationship between the NPL resolution 
process and bank-level and macro-level variables. 
Our empirical results reveal a robust association between the bad loan resolutions in a 
capital-constrained emerging market and the improvement in a bank management quality. We 
measure management quality with the net interest margin (NIM) (Fofack, 2005) and the 
inefficiency ratios (Louzis, Vouldis, and Metaxas, 2012) and show that the improvements in these 
profit-generating indicators help to build up loan loss provisioning cushions and to write-off 
unrecoverable debts. We also find selected internal governance variable such as audit committee 
activity significantly explain the resolution of NPL.  However, we find limited support for 
institutional ownership, another internal governance variable, for playing a role in the NPL 
resolution process, while board independence did not work out at all in explaining the resolution 
of bad loans as opposed to usual findings in the developed market. Further, we show under some 
condition, market monitoring proxied by credit rating variable can be significantly associated with 
net NPL (adjusted for loan loss reserves) resolution.   
 Finally, we find that the macro-level factors, including economic growth and financial 
development, are also strongly associated with the bad loans’ gradual write-offs in an emerging 
banking sector.  It is also important to note that all the observed improvements in the governance 
and asset quality bank characteristics observed in this explorative study occurred amid a cascade 
of the regulatory reforms that we carefully trace and document in the paper.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, using hand-collect data, this study 
provides evidence on severe bad loan problem resolution by using bank-level data in the previously 
unexplored low-income no-bailout country environment. Second, we are the first study to 
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document empirical evidence on flow-based approach to NPL resolution (Klingebiel, 2000; Dado 
and Klingebiel, 2000). Third, several studies, e.g., Shehzad et al., 2010; Saunders et al., 1990; 
Laeven and Levine, 2009; Chalermchatvichien et al., 2013; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Espinoza 
and Prasad, 2010; document factors driving the evolution of NPL accumulation. We complement 
this literature by documenting factors that are associated with the evolution of NPLs’ recovery. 
Fourth, our results show the relative role of overlapping channels of NPL resolution for a low-
income economy in the presence of decade-long internal and external governance reforms in a 
banking sector. Our paper highlight that the regulatory reforms, economic growth, and financial 
development at the macro level enabled banks operating efficiently to write-off bad debts reduce 
NPL over time. As for other channels, improvements in internal governance proxied by audit 
committee activities, market monitoring proxied by credit rating is strongly associated with gross 
and net NPL resolution respectively. From a broader perspective, this study contributes to the 
rapidly growing literature on emerging banking markets and informs ongoing academic and 
regulatory debates on the efficient nonperforming loans resolution. The lessons from Bangladesh 
show that strong financial performance, cost control, healthy loan portfolio growth and a 
generation of sizeable operating income help banks to build up loan loss reserves and help them 
to write off previously accumulated bad loans. They also show that corporate governance reforms 
that enhance the role of the internal audit committees may also contribute to the bad loan problem 
resolution.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines institutional and 
background details and provides a snapshot of the massive regulatory reforms that took place in 
the banking sector of Bangladesh; in Section 3 we describe our data, sample construction, and 
variables; and   Section 4 presents our empirical results, while Section 5 offers concluding remarks.   
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2. Background: Bangladesh banking system development and regulatory reforms. 
As shown in the macroeconomic snapshot(Panel A of Table 1), Bangladesh is a low-
income country with an annual per capita income of only $840 in 2012.  This emerging economy 
in South Asia is also characterized by a dense population, high vulnerability to natural disasters 
(floods) and long-standing political instability.  Despite all these challenges, however, the 
country’s banking system demonstrated significant improvements in the last decade, including a 
six-time increase in its total assets and about twofold increases in the core capital ratios. Most 
notably, the aggregate ratio of nonperforming loans for the whole banking system has dropped 
from its peak of 41% of total loans in 1999 to 31.5% in 2001 and then to 10% in 2012. This steep 
and successful trend in the NPL resolution makes Bangladesh an interesting case for its peer group 
low-income economies (Figure 1). In this section, we briefly discuss the milestones of the 
aggressive country-level reforms implemented in the last decade to provide an institutional 
framework for our subsequent bank-level analyses.  
[Table 1 and Figure 1] 
After Bangladesh achieved its independence in 1971, the country’s banking system 
consisted of only eleven banks, including six nationalized commercial banks, two state-owned 
specialized banks, and three foreign banks.  During the 1980s, the sector expanded due to the active 
entry of the de novo private banks. According to the annual report of Bangladesh Bank, as of the 
end of 2012, the country’s banking sector consisted of 47 “scheduled” banks6, including 23private 
                                                 





commercial banks7, four state-owned commercial banks, seven Islamic banks8, four specialized 
government development banks and nine branches of foreign banks.9In this study, we focus our 
analysis on the stand-alone financial intermediaries that provide traditional banking services to 
firms and individuals by attracting deposits and issuing interest-based loans; therefore, our focus 
group includes conventional private and state-owned commercial banks. Although the four state 
banks dominate the banking system, their asset share reduced from 46.5% in 2001 to 26.0% in 
2012 (Panel B of Table 1). Because of these market structure changes, the private commercial 
banks account for most of the industry assets now, with a 62.2% combined asset share.  
During the early 1990s and 2000s, the Bangladesh banking system was one of the most 
heavily burdened with unrecoverable bad loans. The accumulation of these problem loans is 
commonly attributed to the poor credit underwriting standards, including the prevalence of 
government-directed and politically-driven lending on nonmarket terms.  Also, weakly capitalized 
banks could not write- off bad debts because of the poor quality of underlying collateral, legal 
barriers to recovering and insufficient provisioning for loan losses.  For example, as shown in 
Panel A of Table 1, as of the end of 2001, the combined capital and reserves ratio to total assets 
was only 4.2%, and the banking sector could only maintain 60.4% of the required provisions.  
Since the late 90s, cleaning up banks’ balance sheets from NPLs was recognized by regulators in 
Bangladesh Bank (henceforth BB) as a priority for the banking sector development. With above 
                                                 
7 As our sample statistics will show, majority of these private commercial banks are not controlled by founders and 
they are listed in the stock exchange. Also the founder controlled banks are required by law to be listed in the stock 
exchange. In that regards, the commercial banks in our sample are not truly private commercial as it might appear by 
its name. We didn’t include in our sample a private commercial bank since it is not listed in the stock exchange. Our 
final sample include 22 PCB and 4 state-owned banks.   
 
8Islami Shariah based private commercial banks operate under the Islami Shariah principles commonly denoted as the 
Profit-Loss Sharing model. These unconventional banking institutions are excluded from our empirical analysis.  
 
9All foreign banks in Bangladesh are incorporate abroad and do not disclose separate financial statements. 
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80% of all classified loans in the loss category, it was evident that major NPL resolution efforts 
should be associated with the write-offs rather than recoveries. Since 2000, the BB introduced a 
series of aggressive reforms that put continuous pressure on private commercial banks to reduce 
its exposure to non-performing loan. These reforms included such measures as a new loan 
classification system,  guidelines for the management of core risks (credit risk, foreign exchange 
risk, asset and liability management, operational and technology risks, money laundering and 
terrorism financing risks), limits to the related parties transaction and single borrower exposures,  
increased transparency, strengthening of internal control, a requirement to introduce a risk 
management department in each bank, enforcement of supervisory monitoring and penalties for 
regulatory non-compliance. One of the key regulatory reforms initiated by the BB is the “policy 
on write-off of bad loan.” According to BB bank circular BRPD no. 3 dated January 13, 2003, 
banks are allowed to write-off five-year-old bad loans provided 100% provision maintained. It was 
further instructed to the banks to initiate the write-off process as soon as a bad loan meet the 
criteria. This was the first time the BB allowed write-off bad loans that’s why it had a significant 
impact on the non-performing loan of the banks. Also during 2003, BB issued another regulation 
through BRPD circular no. 1 dated January 13, 2003, instructing the banks to examine the reasons 
behind the default on loans when the borrower attempt to reschedule the loan. It further instructs 
the banks not to renegotiate with the borrower if the money is not invested in the business or 
habitual defaulted borrower. The circular also directed the banks with limits to reschedule in case 
of term loans and loans for working capital and prohibits defaulted borrows from applying for 
loans within one year of default. Over our sample period, there have been many changes to 




Simultaneously, the BB introduced and enforced many corporate governance reforms in 
the banking area including specification of the responsibilities, qualifications, and accountabilities 
of banks’ board of directors and CEOs. Governance reforms also put a cap on the boards’ size in 
an attempt to reduce excessive influence of controlling families on CEO and management 
decisions. The regulator also prohibited banks from extending or renewing credit to previously 
defaulted borrowers and, as an unconventional measure in the corrupt economy, banned influential 
and politically-connected defaulters from participation in parliamentary elections and 
directorships of financial intermediaries. 
Under the new corporate governance standards, bank directors are required to have at least 
15 years of relevant professional experience and spotless credit history. Board size is capped at 13 
members, a significant reduction for banks that used to have more than 20 directors.  The directors’ 
tenure is limited to six years, and each family cannot have more than two members on board.  The 
maximum CEO age is capped at 65 years. 
In Appendix 1, we document a wave of the intense regulatory reforms in Bangladesh’s 
banking sector during the study period. By browsing all regulatory circulars from 1998 to 2012, 
we were able to identify 28 key regulations, including 20 circulars that target the credit risk 
management practice, bad loan classifications and provisioning, and the NPL write-offs 
guidelines.  The remaining eights documents introduce multiple bank governance reforms that we 
discussed in this section. 
[Appendix 1] 
Thus, as shown in Appendix 1, all major governance reforms were introduced during the 
study period and overlapped with aggressive credit risk management and NPL resolution reforms. 
In addition to the enforcement of the regulatory discipline and internal corporate governance 
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standards compliance, the private commercial banks were forced to get listed on the national stock 
exchange to promote better transparency and private monitoring incentives.10 In this study, we 
exploit this unique period of aggressive regulatory and governance reforms in an emerging market 
context to provide evidence on the relative importance of the system-wide regulatory reforms and 
bank-level characteristics on the NPL resolution.  
3. Data and summary statistics.  
3.1. Sample construction 
The bank-level data for this study are hand-collected from the annual reports (hard copies) 
of banks in Bangladesh, obtained locally. Each report contains a full set of the audited financial 
statements and detailed disclosures of the banks’ corporate governance arrangements and 
structures.  The sample period covers 13 years, from 2000 to 2012.  Overall, we were able to find 
reports for 26 unique commercial banks, including four state banks and 22 private domestic 
commercial banks. Collectively, the sample banks account for about 70% of Bangladesh’s banking 
sector assets, with some variation across years. As explained in the background section, 
development banks, Islamic banks, and foreign banks’ branches are excluded from the study 
sample due to their non-comparable business models, regulatory regimes and/or data availability 
limitations.  Our total sample consists of 330 bank-year observations for domestic commercial (the 
so-called “scheduled”) banks.  At the regression analyses stage, we miss some observations due to 
one-period lags and loan growth rate construction; the final usable number of observations in 
                                                 
10It is also worth mentioning that, despite a wave of regulatory reforms that we list Appendix 1, the regulatory 
forbearance in this banking sector remained relatively high and some banks delayed the introduction of the new 
requirements and standards. Although these delays in compliance obscure the timing of regime shifts, they also create 
a valuable cross-sectional variation in sample banks that we exploit in our empirical analyses. 
12 
 
regression tables is 301.  In Appendix 2, we document the exact composition of our sample, by the 
bank and by year. 
[Appendix 2] 
3.2. Variables and summary statistics: Bangladesh context  
Table 2defines six blocks of variables used in this study.  These blocks include proxies for 
nonperforming loans, internal corporate governance, management quality, external market 
monitoring, macro-level development indicators, and several standard bank-level control variables 
that account for bank size, capitalization, lending activity, age, and market structure. Below, we 
briefly describe the measures and the distribution of the dependent and explanatory study 
variables.   
[Table2] 
3.2.1. Dependent variables: Nonperforming loan ratios 
We start our construction of the NPL measures from an in-depth examination of the 
country-specific regulatory definitions of bad and problem loans.  Panel A of Table 3 summarizes 
the currently adopted five-group loan classification schema and the loan loss provision 
requirements for each group.  For this study, our focus is on the three categories of classified loans: 
substandard, doubtful and bad loans.  The problem loan recognition thresholds in this table show 
that the regulatory loan classification in Bangladesh remains lax as it recognizes a loan as classified 
only after it was more than six months overdue.  Thus, all three categories of classified loans on 
balance sheets are deeply overdue by all international standards, and we treat them as a cumulative 
bad loans category in the subsequent analysis.11 For illustrative purposes, we also report the loan 
                                                 
11In 2005, the BB introduced the Special Mention Account (SMA) to align loan groups with the best international 
standards and to recognize problem loans as early as 90 days overdue. Under the updated classification, SMA is 
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portfolios’ composition by unclassified and classified loans’ components for an average sample 
bank by years (Panel B of Table 3). These numbers show that major improvement in the loans’ 
portfolio quality comes from the shrinking share of most seasoned overdue loans (“Bad or Loss” 
category) which drop from 17.6% of gross loans in 2000 to only 3.5% in 2010 although we observe 
a recent increasing trend in NPL ratio, at the end of 2012 the NPL ratio stood at 8.5% (also 
documented in Rafiq(2015)).  
[Table 3] 
Following the BB conventions, we construct three alternative NPL ratios.  The first 
dependent variable, Gross NPL ratio, is the year-end sum of classified loans - including 
substandard, doubtful and bad - all divided by total gross loans.  This is the standard credit risk 
measure in banking literature.  As reported in Table 4, the average gross NPL ratio in the study 
sample is 9.24%, and it varies broadly from 0% to 44.59%, with a quartile range from 2.20% to 
11.96%. 
[Table 4] 
Our second and supplementary dependent variable is the Old NPL ratio. It accounts 
exclusively for the oldest, at least one year overdue (or bad loss) loans on a bank’s balance sheet, 
as a ratio of total loans. For the full sample, this ratio varies from 0% to 48.00%, with an average 
of 7.73% and the median at 2.85%. Finally, our third dependent variable, Net NPL ratio, is the 
sum of classified loans net of accumulated loan loss reserves as the proportion of net loans, where 
net loans are gross loans minus loan loss reserves. This is the measure of uncovered NPLs; it allows 
to account for bank capacity to build up a shield (reserves) against future write-offs and is widely 
                                                 
formally a part of unclassified loans, with a low provisioning requirement of only 5%(Table 3). Due to its relatively 
recent introduction, bank-level SMA data are not available for the whole sample period and we cannot rely on this 
category in constructing NPL measures. 
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used in the BB disclosure statistics.  As expected, the Net NPL ratio for an average bank is smaller 
than the Gross NPL ratio (with a mean of 6.22% and a median of 2.26%) and, at the left-side tail 
of the distribution, it can even take negative values if the loan loss reserves exceed classified loans 
level (Table 4). 
The dynamics of NPL ratios vary considerably between two groups of banks in our sample. 
As shown in Table 3 Panel C, the state-owned banks have higher NPL ratios compared to private 
commercial banks and both types of banks managed to reduce a significant portion of bad loans 
over the sample period. The private commercial banks were able to contain their NPL ratios in 
single digit. However, in the recent years (2011 and 2012) NPL ratios for both types of banks are 
in the rise due to deterioration of credit quality in the overall banking system. 
3.2.2. Explanatory variables of interest.  
Internal corporate governance. Bank governance variables include the bank’s ownership, 
the board of directors’ and audit committee characteristics.  All governance variables are 
constructed from the raw data reported in bank annual reports’ narratives on bank ownership, 
management, and governance practices. 
We capture a bank ownership type with two variables: the dummy variable for the 
Founders-controlled banks and with a continuous variable for the shareholdings of Institutional 
owners.  As reported in Table 4, in 40% of bank-year observations, the banks are controlled by the 
founding members. The institutional ownership ranges from zero to 39.35% shares, with a mean 
value of 9.14% and a median of 6.98%. These numbers suggest that institutional owners in our 
sample are either non-existent or exclusively minority shareholders.   
We use the proportion of independent directors as a standard proxy for Board 
independence. As we show in Table 4, the ratio of independent directors is extremely low in this 
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banking sector, with an average of 4.37% and 7.14% at the 75th percentile of the pooled data 
distribution.  Notably, in the Bangladesh regulatory framework, the board independence is heavily 
driven by many concurrent regulatory initiatives, including the requirement to include independent 
directors on the board and to reduce the board size to a maximum of thirteen directors.12 
Finally, as a crude observable measure for the Audit Committee monitoring activity, we 
use a natural log of the number of its meetings per year.  One pitfall for using this measure is that 
a bank may fail to disclose any audit committee activity in its annual report.  We classify all such 
cases as an indication of a weak or absent role of the audit committee and code them as zeroes. 
This way, from a broader perspective, the audit committee activity variable can be viewed as a 
combined measure of a bank’s internal control practices’ transparency and activity.  The average 
raw number of audit committee meetings for the pooled sample is 6.92. 
Management quality. Bank managers in Bangladesh are hired professionals that are 
typically not affiliated with founding members or other owners’ groups.   Although the BB has 
developed and introduced multiple circulars, guidelines, qualification requirements and 
educational brochures to improve the senior bank management skills and culture, the bank 
management quality is still difficult to observe directly.  Thus, we opt to measure management 
quality with the two commonly used proxies, net interest margin (NIM) and Inefficiency ratio.  
We measure NIM, an indicator of the core profitability of the bank financial intermediation 
model, as a difference between annual interest income and interest expense, divided by the bank’s 
total assets.  The mean and the median values of this bank management quality indicator are about 
2.13% (Table 4). We measure Inefficiency, the traditional measure of bank productivity, as the 
                                                 
12To reduce the founding directors and their family members’ intrusion into the day-to-day bank operations, the BB 
imposed this board size threshold and gave banks several years to bring their board size in compliance with it. Our 
sample covers this transition period. We discuss BB governance reforms in more details in the background section of 
this paper.  
16 
 
ratio of annual operating expenses to operating income. Higher values of the inefficiency ratio 
indicate higher costs required to generate each dollar of bank revenue and, therefore, a lower 
quality of bank management.  This inefficiency ratio varies dramatically, from 20.44% to 
175.42%, with a mean value of 46.82% and a median of 42.26%.  
Market monitoring. Bank’s incentives for the NPL resolution in response to the market 
discipline pressure and higher financial disclosure standards are captured with a bank’s public 
listing status, its availability of an external credit rating and its Big 4 external auditors.  During the 
sample period, most of the commercial banks undergo public listing on the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(the major stock exchange in Bangladesh). This major transformation in the Bangladesh banking 
system from closely held private banks towards more open, more transparent, publicly listed 
institutions was largely orchestrated by the regulators and occurred at different years for different 
banks.  By the end of 2012, 85% of the sample banks were publicly listed.  
To construct a Credit rating availability dummy, we use information from two local credit 
rating agencies officially recognized by the BB and detect the first year of the credit rating 
assignment for each bank. We further compare these data with the credit ratings reported in the 
banks’ annual report to resolve any discrepancies.  Notably, during the sample period, none of the 
banks in Bangladesh had an international credit rating.  It is also worth mentioning that excluding 
the last sample year, credit ratings were not formally required for banks in Bangladesh. It ensures 
substantial variability in the frequency of rated and non-rated banks by years. For the whole sample 
period, there are 50% of bank-year observations with at least one officially assigned credit rating. 
To construct the Big 4 auditor indicator variable, which we use as yet another proxy for 
bank transparency and market monitoring intensity, we obtain a list of all bank auditors in 
Bangladesh that are formally affiliated with the Big 4 global auditing firms and match them with 
17 
 
the sample banks’ auditors’ names. Overall, 46% of bank-year observations in the sample is 
associated with a Big 4 auditor presence (Table 4). 
Macro-level development indicators. To explore the effects of across-the-board 
macroeconomic improvements and growth on the bad loans resolution in Bangladeshi banks, we 
employ two commonly used macro-level time series. The first macro-level variable, Economic 
growth, is the annual percentage growth rate of the country’s GDP. The second macro-level 
variable, Financial development, is proxied with the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector 
divided by the country’s GDP.  Both data series come from the publicly available World Bank 
Development Indicators database.  For the pooled sample, the mean and median annual GDP 
growth rate is about 6%, with a relatively narrow range - from 4.42% to 6.70%.  The financial 
development indicator demonstrates much higher variation, with an average of 36.03%, a 
minimum of 24.67% and a maximum of 47.05%. 
3.2.3. Bank-level control variables. 
The core set of bank-level financial variables that may potentially effect bad loans ratios 
includes asset size, market structure,13capitalization and three measures of bank lending activity 
and loan portfolio composition – the loan to asset ratio, directed loans ratio and the loan portfolio 
growth rate.  
The average capital ratio is only 6.23%, and it varies broadly, from -13.41% to 29.68% 
(Table 4).  These numbers suggest an overall low capitalization in the country’s banking sector 
and regulatory forbearance when it comes to severely undercapitalized banks.14The mean (median) 
                                                 





Loan to Assets ratio is 64.22% (65.14%). The annual bank-level loan growth rate is high and 
volatile, with an average of 22.19% and a standard deviation of 18.49%.  Although these growth 
rates are extraordinary by the standards of a developed banking market, they are broadly 
comparable to growth rates in other emerging and developing banking markets.   
One other country-specific control variable used in this study is the Directedloans ratio 
which accounts for the weight of micro-lending and agricultural loans in the total loan portfolio; 
these so-called “directed” loans represent a special class of loans in Bangladesh. All commercial 
banks, including private and state-owned banks, are expected to grant such loans per the regulator-
assigned quotas that vary from year to year based on government social and economic recovery 
agendas. Although these loans can be very risky, their loan loss provisioning rules are set at 
artificially low levels and their overdue time thresholds are also inflated, at 60 months or above. 
In other words, these loans are accounted for separately, outside of the standard five-group 
classification of loans reported in Table 2. Therefore, banks’ involvement indirect lending can 
potentially bias both of our bad loans measures, gross and net NPL ratios, and the direction of this 
bias is difficult to detect a priori due to the nonconventional provisioning rules for these loans.  To 
deal with this issue, we introduce the Directed loans measure that should absorb all potential 
effects of this government-directed lending activity on reported bad loans portfolios.  Although 
the mean value for the directed loans ratio is relatively low at 4.58%, the quartile range is from 
0.69% to 6.43% and the maximum is at a high 40.25%.  These statistics suggest the skewed and 
uneven distribution of the directed lending burden among our sample banks and further justify the 
need to explicitly control for these loans in nonperforming loans regressions.   
                                                 
14 Overall, there are four unique banks and 14 (out of 277 total) bank-year observations with a negative capital level 
in our sample; these observations are approximately equally distributed by years. The mean capital ratio in this heavily 
undercapitalized subsample is -6.08%; the minimal capital ratio is -13.41% (as shown in Table 4). 
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To account for the fact that de novo banks are expected to have a lighter bad loans burden 
as it takes time to accumulate delinquent loans in a bank’s assets portfolio, we include a New bank 
dummy to distinguish banks that are up to three years old. As reported in Table 4, only 7% of the 
sample observations fall into the new bank category.  
Finally, we included concentration ratio as one of the control variables in our regression 
model to incorporate the effect of market structure on non-performing loan ratio. We constructed 
theCR3 (concentration ratio for top 3 banks) for the banks by adding the deposits of top three 
banks then dividing by total deposits in the market in a year. We expect a positive relationship 
between concentration and bad loans. Banks operating in a less competitive environment (i.e., 
market concentration is high) encourages more aggressive lending, the risk-taking by banks might 
lead to that might lead to poor credit disbursement increasing the proportion of bad loan which is 
consistent with structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. 15   On an average, top three banks 
(mainly large state-owned banks) control about 54.75% of the deposit market. The concentration 
ratio was high in the earlier part of the sample (e.g., 62.82% in 2000) and as more banks entered 
the market, the competition increased, and the concentration ratio dropped to 41.28%.  
4.  Results 
4.1. Descriptive evidence  
Table 5 tracks the evolution of bank-level characteristics by year, including problem loans, 
corporate governance, management quality and market monitoring measures over the 2000 – 2012 
period for an average sample bank.  With exceptions in few years, on aggregate, the numbers in 
                                                 
15  For more on structure-performance-conduct hypothesis see Gilbert (1984), Hannan(1991), Lloyed-Williams, 
Molyneux and Thornton (1994).  
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Table 5 reveal gradual and substantial improvements in almost all components of bank governance 
and financial performance during the study period.  For the banks in our sample, the average Gross 
NPL ratio dropped from a high 18.50% in 2000 to only 8.20% in 2012.16 During the same period, 
the average Old NPL ratio dropped from 17.31% to 5.74%. The average Net NPL ratio follows a 
very similar pattern and decreases from 14.27% in 2000 to 4.78% 2012.  
[Table 5] 
There are also notable changes across all corporate governance measures. First, the 
proportion of founders-controlled banks decreases from 55% of the sample banks in 2000 to 19% 
in 2012.  Second, there is also a twofold increase in institutional ownership in an average bank, 
from 6.20% in 2000 to 12.61% in 2012.  Third, board independence evolves from no independent 
directors on board in the first five years to a sharp increase from 0.38% to13.38% in the last eight 
years. Finally, in response to the regulatory initiatives, the disclosure and frequency of audit 
committee meetings visibly jumps in 2003 and continues to increase during the subsequent sample 
years. 
Bank-level management quality improvements are also pronounced.  The inefficiency ratio 
steadily dropped from 60.73% in 2000 to 47.26% in 2012.  Simultaneously, the average NIM value 
increases almost twofold, from 1.48% to 2.41%.  Collectively, these patterns suggest dramatic 
improvements in the productivity and profitability of Bangladeshi banks.  
In regards to external market monitoring, we detect a sharp increase in the number of banks 
with assigned credit rating. The proportion of such banks is negligible until 2005 and then jumps 
                                                 
16The Gross NPL ratio slightly increase in 2007, which might be attributed to the conversion of considerable amount 
off-balance sheet exposures into funded facilities that part of it become overdue and classified. Consequently, BB 
issued a regulation through BRPD circular no. 8 and 10 dated August 8 and September 18, 2007, respectively, 
instructing commercial banks to maintain a 1% general provision against off-balance sheet exposures in addition to 
the existing provisioning requirements. Also, this general provision will be part of regulatory capital as supplementary 
(Tier II) capital.       
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to above 50% in 2006 and further to a high 100% in the last two sample years.  This pattern reflects 
a regulatory regime shock as the BB started to require officially assigned and publicly disclosed 
credit rating for all commercial banks from at least one of the two local credit rating agencies.  The 
Big 4 auditor dummy exhibits substantial variability suggesting frequent changes of external 
auditors. By the end of 2012, all except four sample banks were publicly listed and traded on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange. 
Descriptive statistics in Table 5 also reports the evolution of bank-level control variables, 
such as bank size, capitalization the loan portfolio composition, and growth.  We observe that, on 
average, banks in Bangladesh have substantially improved their capital buffers, from a low 4.78% 
in 2000 to a healthy 8.85% in 2012.Another notable pattern is the increase in average bank lending 
activity, which increases to 61.38% by the end of 2012. Annual loan growth rates, however, are 
volatile and do not follow any distinct pattern, ranging from 12.71% (in 2012) to 34.04% (in 2001). 
Although these growth rates are high by the standards of any developed banking market, they are 
not exceptionally high for an emerging market.  
Overall, the descriptive analysis of the corporate governance variables reveals substantial 
time-series differences. It also shows that bad loan resolution was accompanied by many visible 
and largely regulator-driven improvements in board independence, institutional ownership, market 
monitoring, management quality and bank capitalization.  
The bottom part of Table 5 reports the evolution of the macro-level variables. These annual 
statistics show a pronounced upward financial development trend as the ratio of domestic private 
credit to GDP gradually increases twofold, from 24.67% in 2000 to 43.00% in 2012, indicating 
the growing role of banks in lending to the country’s growing economy.  The economic growth 
variable, however, does not change dramatically over time, averaging about 6% annual GDP 
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growth. Finally, the concentration ratio gradually declined over the period implying a steady 
improvement in the market structure within the banking sector.   
4.2. Regression results 
Our main regression results are presented in Tables 6, 7 and 8.  We construct a separate 
regression table for each of the three dependent variables - Gross NPL (Table 6), Old NPL (Table 
7) and Net NPL (Table 8) ratios. All the key explanatory variables of interest, such as corporate 
governance, management quality and market monitoring proxies (defined in Table 2), are one-
period lagged. Other control variables that define bank financial position and may affect NPL 
ratios - such as bank size, capitalization, and lending activity - are also one year lagged. The new 
bank dummy variable, loan growth rate, and concentration ratio are contemporaneous, as are 
macro-level (exogenous) variables.  
[Tables 6 to 8] 
The first four models in each regression table exploit the panel structure of our data and 
include time and bank fixed effects that control for the unobserved heterogeneity.  In Model 5, we 
attempt to utilize additional cross-sectional variation among banks and pool our data by omitting 
bank fixed effects.  The last model in each regression table (Model 6) includes bank time fixed 
effects but substitutes time fixed effects with the macro-level variables. To account for potential 
multicollinearity among internal governance, management quality, and external market 
monitoring characteristics, we estimate separate regressions for each of the three sets of 
explanatory variables of interest in Models 1 to 3.  In contrast, Models 4 to 6 incorporate all study 
variables. 
Collectively, the fixed effect regressions’ results in the three regression tables with 
alternative dependent variables reveal that after accounting for bank and time fixed effects and 
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other time-varying control variables, we find a robust association between bad loan resolution at 
the bank level and an improvement in management quality.  The coefficients on lagged NIM and 
Inefficiency variables, our proxies for bank management quality, are highly significant across 
alternative model specifications for all three versions of the NPL ratio as a dependent variable. 
The economic magnitude of these coefficients is also high.  For example, a 1% increase in NIM is 
associated with an approximately 0.84% (model 4, table 6) decrease in the gross NPL ratio in the 
following period.  The magnitude of this coefficient is higher for Old NPL and about the same for 
Net NPL dependent variables. The improvement in the inefficiency ratio has a less economically 
pronounced but still statistically significant effect: a 1% decrease in the inefficiency ratio is 
associated with about 0.03% (model 4, table 6) decrease in the NPL ratio, with some variation in 
the exact size of this coefficient depending upon the model specification. Notably, management 
quality effects remain robust across all alternative models’ specifications. This result is consistent 
with the idea that a bank’s performance and its ability to generate high NIM (and, to a lesser extent, 
control costs) play a major role in recovery from a bad loans problem.  Apparently, higher 
operational profitability allows to allocate larger provisions for bad loans and eventually write 
them off.  
Our second notable result is that corporate governance variables may also play a role in the 
NPL resolution. However, their effects are more fragile and less straightforward. Based on the 
collective evidence from the estimation results in Tables 6 to 8, the audit committee activity seems 
to be the best candidates among internal governance factors to be associated with significant 
reduction in the NPL ratios. A level-log coefficient interpretation on the Audit committee activity 
variable suggests that as changes in the frequency of meetings in a year increase by 1% the NPL 
ratio drops from about 0.99% to 1.7% (depending on the model specification). 
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In the case of the founding families’ control of the bank dummy, the direction of the 
relation is surprising but in line with our prior descriptive evidence: banks with concentrated 
ownership seem to have better quality loan portfolios. This effect is sizeable based on the point 
estimates of the coefficient.  At the same time, it is not statistically significant across all models. 
Our results suggest that following an increase in institutional ownership is not strongly associated 
with a decrease in non-performing loan ratios. Finally, the increase in the board independence does 
not seem to have any effects on the next period’s NPL ratios.   
Our third result is that bank-level improvements in external market monitoring which exceed 
across-the-board improvements (that are absorbed in the time effects) play at best limited role in 
resolving bad loans in this emerging market context.  As reported in table 8, we detect a statistically 
significant negative association between Credit rating dummies and the follow-up NPL ratio in 
models. The reason credit rating is significant in Net NPL model is that the credit rating varies for 
banks who don’t provide sufficient provisions for bad loans or loan loss reserves and those banks 
which provided for sufficient provisions for bad loans carried out credit rating. There is also a 
puzzling result in Models 3 and 4 of Table 6 that suggests an increasing gross NPL ratio in the 
years following bank’s public listing.  All else being equal, it suggests relative disincentives for 
bad loans resolution in the post-IPO market. This result is highly sensitive to the model 
specification and requires further investigation. We expect a complex interplay and potential trade-
offs between increased transparency, lower ownership concentration and less incentives for the 
pre-listing window-dressing following the bank listing on the local exchange. Taken together, 
these results suggest that existing market monitoring and market discipline channels in this low-
income economy are not powerful enough to generate strong incentives to clean banks’ balance 
sheets from problem loans. Another plausible explanation is that incentives alone may not be 
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sufficient in resolving the NPL problem. Banks may need the actual capacity in terms of higher 
earning and/or capitalization to be able to clean up their balance sheets from unrecoverable debts.   
For bank-level control variables, reported as a separate block in regression tables, we find 
several significant effects in expected directions. Undercapitalized banks exhibit difficulty in 
reducing their gross NPL ratio as they simply do not have substantial capital cushions to create 
reserves and/or write off bad loans from their portfolios. For the net NPL ratio, this effect 
disappears as the net NPL ratio directly accounts for the buildup of loan loss reserves.  Also, a 
bank’s increase in lending activity, as measured by the loan to asset ratio, is positively associated 
with an increase in the bad loan ratio especially evident in case of net NPL ratio. We also find a 
significant association between loan growth with NPL ratios only for gross and net NPL ratio. We 
only find limited evidence of an association between de novo banks and directed loans with NPL 
ratio. In our sample, larger banks seems have higher non-performing loan ratio as expected. 
Finally, we predicted and find a stronger positive association between market structure (i.e., 
concentration ratio) and the non-performing loan. 
Finally, our supplementary important result is the strong role of macro-level development 
factors in the NPL ratios’ decline (Model 6): increase in the country’s economic growth and 
financial development is robustly associated with the shrinking NPL ratios.  For example, a 1% 
increase in the GDP growth is associated with about a 0.75% decrease in the bank’s NPL ratios.  
On a similar note, a 1% increase in the financial development indicator is associated with almost 
a 2.95% reduction in the NPL ratios.  
4.3. Additional tests and robustness checks 
As a final round of robustness checks, we perform several additional tests. First, we 
checked the delayed (allowing two lags) association between of several governance variables and 
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resolution of the non-performing loan and find a robust relation between audit committee activities 
and NPL resolution, however, we did not find any statistical relationship at conventional level 
between founders-controlled banks, board independence and institutional ownership with NPL 
ratios. Table 9 shows the lagged results of our full model including bank and time fixed effects. 
[Table 9] 
Second, we control for the influence of extreme outliers by winsorizing all continuous 
variables at the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution.  Third, we re-estimate Model 4 in Tables 
6 to 8 using robust standard errors clustered at the bank level.17 As expected, this estimation 
produces larger standard errors; however, the result for the NIM and bank capitalization in 
reducing the NPL burden remains robust.  Fourth, we re-estimate all regressions in Tables 6 to 8 
by excluding a few special case banks, such as state-owned banks (N = 4) and de novo banks (N=2) 
that entered the industry during the sample period.  Fifth, we exclude observations from the initial 
two-year period to allow a balanced panel of banks and to isolate the effects of the lax disclosure 
regime in the early years of the banking sector reforms and potentially lower quality of governance 
data in the 2000 and 2001 annual reports. Sixth, we substitute year time effects with the linear 
trend variable for modeling the gradual, across-the-board evolution of the banking sector reforms 
in Bangladesh. As expected, the time trend variable is highly statistically significant and suggests 
a strong overall reduction in the Bangladesh’s banks’ NPL ratios by about 2.2% or more 
(depending on the model specification) in each subsequent year. Seventh, we re-estimate panel 
OLS regressions with bank and time fixed effects using log-levels of the gross, old and net 
nonperforming loans instead of ratios. 
 
                                                 
17 We avoid using bank-clustered standard errors in our main regression analyses due to small number of clusters in 
our sample.  We do, however, use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in all estimated regression.  
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Overall, the results of these robustness checks do not alter our main conclusions concerning 
the impact of bank governance, management and monitoring variables on the NPL resolution that 
we summarize in Table 10.  As before, we get fragile and/or marginally significant results for the 
internal governance variables’ role and insignificant results for the Big 4 external auditors and the 
external credit rating availability. At the same time, the above robustness test produces a strong 
association between the operating efficiency and profitability (NIM) and resolution of bad loans. 
They also further support the role of bank capitalization and the macroeconomic development in 
reducing the NPL ratios.  
[Table 10] 
5. Conclusions  
This study explores successful bad loan resolution in a low-income economy during a 
decade of aggressive corporate governance and market monitoring reforms. Using unique bank-
level data for a representative panel of commercial banks in Bangladesh, we show that 
management quality, selected corporate government improvements and the macro-level economic 
development play a significant role in bad loans resolution. We also show that most of these 
improvements occur amid large-scale bank governance and credit risk management regulatory 
reforms that we carefully document in this study.  
At the same time, we find that at the bank level, market monitoring in this low-income 
economy environment seems to be related to the reduction of bad loan ratios under some 
specifications.  The last result, however, should be interpreted with caution due to the relatively 




In Table 10, we summarize our major empirical findings and relate them to the regulatory 
reforms in this low-income economy which, as of the end of our sample period in 2012, has 
gradually recovered from a severe NPL problem in its commercial banking sector by relying on 
the no-bailout policy.  
Overall, the study results provide an optimistic assessment of recovery paths towards a bad 
loan resolution in a vulnerable but rapidly developing banking sector. Even when external capital 
injections are limited, lessons from Bangladesh show that a bank’s strong financial performance, 
operational efficiency along with loan portfolio growth, and a generation of sizeable operating 
income help to build up loan loss reserves and to write off accumulated bad loans. They also show 
that corporate governance reforms that enhance the role of the internal audit committees may also 
contribute to the bad loan problem resolution, even though some of these factors’ effects tend to 
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A wave of the regulatory reforms in the Bangladesh’s banking sector (1998-2012) 
 
This appendix reports the timing and the content of the key regulatory reforms introduced in the 
Bangladeshi banking industry during the 1998 to 2012 period, including 20 regulations related to credit risk 
management and NPL write-offs and 8 regulations on the corporate governance improvements. We identify 
these regulations by browsing the full set of the Bank of Bangladesh circulars around the sample period.  
 






Policy on loan classification and provision. (BRPD-16) 
 
NPL resolution 
2 05/14/2001 Policy on loan classification and  provision-  
(Partial Modification of BRPD-16 of 1998.) (BRPD -09) 
NPL resolution  
3 11/24/2002 Master Circular on Capital Adequacy of Banks (BRPD - 10) NPL resolution 
4 12/23/2002 Policy of the formation of the Bank Audit Committee (BRPD - 12)  Bank governance 
5 01/13/2003    Policies for rescheduling of loans (BRPD – 01) NPL resolution 
6 01/13/2003 Policy on write off of Loan (BRPD - 02) NPL resolution 
7 04/26/2003 Policy on the formation of Board of Directors and qualifications and 
eligibility for the appointment of Directors (BRPD - 12) 
Bank governance 
8 07/24/2003 Restrictions with respect to responsibilities and accountabilities of BOD 
and CEO of Banks (BRPD - 16) 
Bank governance 
9 10/07/2003  Managing Core Risks in Banking (BRPD - 17) NPL resolution 
10 01/20/2004 Reminder on provision on quarterly basis (BRPD-02) NPL resolution 
11 06/07/2004 Submission of statement of loans extended by the Bank Companies to 
the Directors of the Financial Institutions (BRPD - 06) 
NPL resolution 
12 02/15/2005 Policy on loan classification and provisioning- introduction of Special 
Mention Account (BRPD - 02) 
NPL resolution 
13 04/07/2005 Revised policy on loan classification and provision (BRPD – 04)  NPL resolution 
14 08/20/2005 Policy on loan classification and provisioning- Provisioning of Special 
Mention Account (BRPD - 09) 
NPL resolution 
15 12/11/2005 Implementation of Credit Risk Grading Manual (BRPD - 16) NPL resolution 
16 02/14/2006  Other Terms and Conditions of Rescheduling (BRPD - 02)  NPL resolution 
17 03/19/2006 Other Terms and Conditions of Rescheduling (BRPD - 03) NPL resolution 
18 06/05/2006 Master Circular on loan classification and provisioning (BRPD - 05)  NPL resolution 
19 07/05/2006 Policies related to credit rating of banks (BRPD - 06) Bank governance 
20 08/07/2007 Master Circular on loan classification and provisioning (BPRD – 08)  NPL resolution  
21 09/18/2007 General provisioning on loan against Off-Balance Sheet Exposure 
(BPRD – 10) 
NPL resolution  
22 10/09/2007 Capital adequacy and board size (BRPD – 09)  Bank governance  
23 11/05/2007 Policy on the formation, tenure of Board of Directors and qualifications 
and eligibility for the appointment of Directors (BRPD - 11) 
Bank governance 
24 08/18/2008 Appointment of Depositor Directors  (BRPD - 12) Bank governance 
25 04/19/2009 Rescheduling of Loans to Export Industries due to Global Recession 
without required down payment (BRPD-03) 
NPL resolution  
26 12/06/2009 Rescheduling of Loans to Export Industries due to Global Recession 
without required down payment (BRPD-17) 
NPL resolution  
27 12/21/2009 Rescheduling of Loans of affected/or Closed Industries during Care-
taker Government (BRPD-18) 
NPL resolution  
28 02/04/2010 Restrictions with respect to responsibilities and accountabilities of BOD 






List of sample banks: Name, age, listing status, ownership type and sample years. 
 
The study sample consists of 26 unique domestic banks in Bangladesh, including 22 private commercial 
banks (or PCB) and four state-owned commercial banks (or SOCB) for which we were able to hand-collect 
a series of hard copies of annual reports during the 2000 to 2012 period. Development banks, Islamic banks 
and foreign banks’ branches are excluded from the study sample due to their non-comparable business 
models, regulatory regimes and/or data availability limitations.  Collectively, the sample banks account for 
about 70% of Bangladesh’s banking sector assets, with some variation across years. 
 
Bank name  Founding year Listing year Sample years Ownership type 
 
AB Bank 1981 1983 2000-2012 PCB 
Agrani Bank 1972 Not listed 2000-2012 SOCB 
Bank Asia 1999 2003 2000-2012 PCB 
BRAC Bank 2001 2007 2002-2012 PCB 
City Bank 1983 1986 2000-2012 PCB 
Dhaka Bank 1995 2000 2000-2012 PCB 
Dutch Bangla 1995 2001 2001-2012 PCB 
Eastern Bank 1992 1993 2000-2012 PCB 
IFIC 1983 1986 2000-2012 PCB 
Jamuna Bank 2001 2006 2002-2012 PCB 
Janata Bank 1971 Not listed 2000-2012 SOCB 
Mercantile Bank 1999 2003 2000-2012 PCB 
Mutual Trust Bank 1999 2003 2002-2012 PCB 
NBL 1983 1984 2000-2012 PCB 
NCC Bank 1993 2000 2000-2012 PCB 
One Bank 1999 2003 2000-2012 PCB 
Premier Bank 1999 2007 2000-2012 PCB 
Prime Bank 1995 1999 2000-2012 PCB 
Pubali Bank Ltd 1983 1984 2000-2012 PCB 
Rupali Bank 1986 Not listed 2000-2012 SOCB 
Sonali Bank 1972 Not listed 2000-2012 SOCB 
Southeast Bank 1995 2000 2000-2012 PCB 
Standard Bank 1999 2003 2000-2012 PCB 
Trust Bank 1999 2007 2002-2012 PCB 
UCBL 1983 1986 2000-2012 PCB 








Figure 1. Evolution of non-performing loans by World Bank income groups: Unbalanced panel of 
98 countries, 2000 – 2011.  
This graph reports the average values of the NPL/Loans ratio within each income group across time. The 
raw data are obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators database. During all years of 
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Table 1. Bangladesh: Economic and financial development indicators (2001 and 2012).  
Panel A presents the key macroeconomic and banking system development indicators for Bangladesh as of 
2001 (the first year of available and comparable macro-level data) and 2012.  Panel B describes the banking 
system structure for these periods.  The raw macro-level data for these tables come from various issues of 
the Bangladesh Bank Reports and Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics economic reviews.     
 
Panel A. Economic development, banking system performance and problem loans   
  2001 2012 
 
Economic development: Population (million) 129 155 
 Nominal GDP (Tk. billion) 2,536 9147.84 
 Exchange rate (Tk. / $) 54 81.82 
 GDP per capita ($) 393 839.51 
 
Banking system  development: Banking system assets (Tk. billion) 1,280 7030.7 
 Banking system assets to GDP (%) 50.5 76.86 
 Loans / Assets (%) 60.6 60.6 
 Deposits / Assets (%) 74.7 76.74 
 Capital and reserves / Assets (%) 4.2 7.09 
 Regulatory capital / RWA (%) 6.7 10.50 
 NIM (%) 1.0 2.18 
 ROA (%) 0.7 0.60 
 ROE (%) 15.9 8.2 
 
Problem loans indicators: NPL (Tk. billion) 236.0 427.30 
 Required to maintained provisions (%) 60.4 78.3 
 Gross NPL / Total loans (%) 31.5 10.0 
 Net NPL / Net loans (%)  25.6 4.4 
 
Panel B. Banking system structure  
Bank types 
2001 2012 
N of  
banks 
% of system 
assets 
N of  
banks 
% of system 
assets 
 





State commercial banks 4 46.5 4 26.0 
Development financial institutions   5 11.7 4 5.5 
Foreign commercial banks  11 6.9 9 6.3 
 









Nonperforming loans:  
 
Gross NPL ratio   =  Classified loans / Total loans (in %), where the classified loans are 
defined as the sum of  loss, doubtful and substandard loans.  
Old NPL ratio  = Loss loans / Total loans, in %. By the Bangladesh’s regulatory 
definition, these seasoned NPLs are overdue by at least one year.     
Net NPL ratio  = (Classified loans – Specific loan loss reserves) / (Total loans – Specific 
loan loss reserves), in %.   
Internal governance:   
Founders-controlled bank   = 1 if a bank is majority-controlled by “sponsors,”  i.e. by a group of 
closely connected founding private owners.  
Institutional ownership  = Percent of bank shares owned by institutional  and foreign investors 
Board independence   = Percent of independent and depositor directors on board 
Audit committee activity  = Ln (N of disclosed audit committee meetings  in a year + 1)   
  
Management quality:   
Inefficiency   = Cost income ratio defined as Operating expense / Operating income, in 
% 
NIM = Net interest margin, in % 
 
Market monitoring:  
 
Big 4 auditor = 1 if a bank’s external auditor is directly affiliated with one of the Big 4 
global auditing firms and zero otherwise 
Credit rating = 1 if a bank has assigned and publicly disclosed credit rating issued by the 
licensed local agency and  zero otherwise.  
Public listing = 1 if a bank is publicly listed on the stock exchange and zero otherwise 
 
Bank-level control variables: 
Bank size = Ln (Bank size in Taka thousands) 
Capitalization = Book equity to total assets, in % 
Loans / Assets = Gross loans to total assets, in % 
Directed loans = Micro and agricultural loans to total loans, in %. 
Loan growth rate = Annual logarithmic growth rate of a bank’s gross loans, in %. 
New bank = 1 if a bank is three or less years old and zero otherwise.   
CR3 = ∑ of deposits of top three banks divided by total deposits in the market 
in a year, in% 
 
Macro-level factors:  
Economic growth  = Annual growth rate of the country’s GDP, in %  




Table 3. Loan categories in the Bangladesh banking system:  Regulatory definitions and distribution by years in a study sample.  
 
Panel A describes the Bangladesh Bank’s regulatory classification of loans by categories. In Panel B, we report the loan portfolio composition for an 
average sample bank during the study period.  
 
 
Panel A. Loans’ Regulatory Categories in Bangladesh Banking Sector (except Agricultural and Microcredit): 
 




Unclassified loans:    
   Standard   1%  
   Special Mention Account   Overdue 90 days or more; introduced since 2005.  5% 
   
Classified loans: 
 
Months overdue by loan maturity type 
 
Continuous  
or demand loans 
Term loans, 
< 5 years 
Term loans,  
> 5 years 
   Sub-standard 6 6 12 20% 
   Doubtful 9 12 18 50% 















Panel B. Loan portfolio composition in a study sample: Mean, % of total loans (N = 330 bank-year obs.) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
Unclassified loans:  
  
Standard 80.6 83.3 85.6 88.3 91.0 92.4 91.8 89.4 91.4 92.8 94.1 92.5 85.6 




Substandard 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.70 1.9 
Doubtful 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.80 1.5 
Loss 17.6 15.2 12.5 9.5 8.0 6.0 5.7 6.7 5.6 4.7 3.5 4.5 8.5 
 







Panel C. Nonperforming loan ratios among State Owned and Commercial Banks in study sample: Mean, % of total loans  
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
               
State-Owned 
Banks               
Gross NPL ratio   37.55 35.33 32.20 25.70 22.52 19.75 22.51 31.67 23.94 18.97 13.42 9.82 25.15 24.50 
Old NPL ratio 37.04 31.77 29.54 22.60 21.10 18.23 19.95 25.62 21.52 16.90 11.97 8.38 18.99 21.82 
Net NPL ratio 34.11 32.26 29.28 24.73 18.80 15.78 15.23 19.92 13.12 8.62 6.21 3.45 14.73 18.17 
               
Private 
Commercial Banks               
               
Gross NPL ratio   14.27 12.44 11.06 9.24 6.56 4.60 4.15 4.36 3.99 3.53 3.06 3.45 5.99 6.67 
Old NPL ratio 12.92 11.36 9.35 7.16 5.61 3.76 3.10 3.24 2.66 2.51 1.96 2.18 4.01 5.37 




Table 4. Summary statistics:  330 bank-year observations for 26 Bangladesh banks, 2000 – 2012.    
 
The study sample is an unbalanced panel of 330 bank-year observations for 26 unique banks in Bangladesh 
over the 2000 – 2012 period. By construction, the study sample excludes Islamic banks and development 
financial institutions. We also exclude foreign banks branches as they do not disclose annual reports as separate 
entities.  Raw bank-level data are hand-collected from the banks’ annual reports.  Macro-level data comes from 
the World Bank Development Indicators database. The definitions of all study variables are provided in Table 
2.  For dummy variables, this table reports proportion (mean values).  
 








Nonperforming loans:  
       
Gross NPL ratio   9.24 10.79 0.00 2.20 4.31 11.96 44.59 
Old NPL ratio 7.73 10.01 0.00 1.28 2.85 10.18 48.00 
Net NPL ratio 6.22 8.53 -0.89 1.06 2.26 6.63 37.09 
 
Internal governance:  
       
Founders-controlled bank (0; 1) 0.40       
Institutional ownership  9.14 9.69 0.00 0.00 6.98 16.58 39.35 
Board independence  4.37 9.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.14 50.00 
Audit committee activity 1.38 0.97 0.00 0.00 1.61 2.08 3.74 
 
Management quality:  
       
Inefficiency  46.82 19.68 20.44 35.29 42.26 51.70 175.42 
NIM 2.13 1.13 -1.29 1.58 2.16 2.73 8.93 
 
Market monitoring:  
       
Big 4 auditor (0; 1) 0.46       
Credit rating (0; 1)  0.50       
Public listing (0; 1) 0.85       
 
Bank-level control variables: 
       
Bank size  10.79 1.10 7.64 10.10 10.79 11.58 13.53 
Capitalization  6.23 4.00 -13.41 4.56 6.43 8.29 29.68 
Loans / Assets 64.22 8.50 24.64 59.67 65.14 70.46 80.77 
Directed loans 4.58 5.80 0.00 0.69 2.83 6.43 40.25 
Loan growth rate 22.19 18.49 -19.97 10.68 18.39 29.60 114.62 
New bank (0; 1)   0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CR3 54.75 9.70 41.28 44.87 54.40 63.31 70.42 
 
Macro-level factors:  
       
Economic growth   5.94 0.61 4.42 5.74 6.07 6.27 6.70 






Table 5. Descriptive statistics:  Evolution of Bangladesh banks’ characteristics by year (330bank-year observation, 2000 – 2012). 
 
This table documents mean values by year for continuous bank-level variables and proportions for the indicator variables. It also reports the distribution of 
the macro-level variables by year. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 2.  The study sample is an unbalanced panel of 330 bank-year 
observations for 26 unique commercial banks in Bangladesh over the 2000 – 2012 period. Raw bank-level data are hand-collected from the banks’ annual 
reports.  Macro-level data come from the World Bank Development Indicators database. In the first two rows, we also report the number of bank-level 
observations per year and the cumulative asset market share of sample banks. 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
No of Observation 21 22 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
% of Bangladesh banking sector 
assets 
70.0 72.8 71.8 70.8 70.7 68.4 67.6 71.8 70.9 71.6 72.5 71.80 70.85 
Gross NPL ratio   18.50 16.60 14.31 11.77 9.01 6.93 6.97 8.56 7.06 5.91 4.65 4.19 8.20 
Old NPL ratio 17.31 15.07 12.46 9.53 8.00 5.98 5.69 6.68 5.56 4.72 3.50 2.90 5.74 
Net NPL ratio 14.27 12.20 10.28 8.84 6.32 4.93 4.48 5.24 3.97 3.02 2.43 2.29 4.78 
Founders-controlled bank (0; 1) 0.55 0.50 0.58 0.54 0.50 0.46 0.46 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.23 0.23 0.19 
Institutional ownership  6.20 5.36 5.53 7.09 6.82 7.10 8.99 10.84 12.15 11.77 11.46 11.90 12.61 
Board independence  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 1.00 3.92 8.63 9.60 9.72 8.79 13.38 
Audit committee activity 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.42 1.71 1.59 1.59 1.77 1.93 2.00 1.97 2.05 1.52 
Inefficiency  60.73 50.29 59.88 50.25 49.40 43.49 46.10 41.29 41.00 41.10 38.67 41.93 47.26 
NIM 1.48 1.82 1.68 1.73 1.90 2.10 2.20 2.21 2.41 2.26 2.70 2.67 2.41 
Big 4 auditor (0; 1) 0.41 0.32 0.36 0.46 0.62 0.46 0.40 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.54 0.69 0.77 
Credit rating (0; 1)  0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.54 0.81 0.88 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Public listing (0; 1) 0.82 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.88 
Bank size  9.69 10.02 9.88 10.07 10.31 10.49 10.72 10.93 11.14 11.37 11.60 11.80 11.99 
Capitalization 4.78 4.20 4.73 5.52 4.75 4.90 4.74 5.77 6.24 7.30 9.28 9.38 8.85 
Loans / Assets 53.84 59.75 60.37 62.08 63.90 68.80 68.54 66.46 68.81 65.50 67.64 65.44 61.38 
Directed loans 2.98 3.39 2.94 3.38 3.96 3.57 3.43 3.92 4.86 5.40 6.14 6.72 8.40 
Loan growth rate . 34.04 19.99 22.64 27.22 26.12 22.48 16.71 24.81 18.61 26.27 16.62 12.71 
New bank (0; 1)  0.27 0.23 0.35 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
40 
 
Financial development 24.67 27.78 30.15 30.17 32.13 33.81 36.16 37.29 39.21 41.51 47.05 42.47 43.00 
Economic growth 5.94 5.27 4.42 5.26 6.27 5.96 6.63 6.43 6.19 5.74 6.07 6.68 6.20 
CR3 63.81 61.35 70.42 67.59 63.31 59.96 54.39 51.37 48.28 44.86 44.21 43.31 41.28 





Table 6. Regression results:  Determinants of the Gross NPL ratio in Bangladesh banks.  
 
The table reports estimation results for the determinants of the  Gross NPL ratio in an unbalanced panel of 26 
banks in Bangladesh over the 2000 – 2012 period.  Definitions of variables are provided in Table 2. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% .  
 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable:  Gross NPL ratio t 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Internal governance:        
Founders-controlled bank t-1 -1.733*   -1.097 -1.529 -0.744 
 (0.964)   (0.974) (1.191) (1.693) 
Institutional ownership t-1 -0.038   -0.068 -0.102* -0.053 
 (0.045)   (0.045) (0.052) (0.054) 
Board independence t-1 0.021   0.024 -0.006 0.027 
 (0.040)   (0.040) (0.040) (0.068) 
Audit committee activity t-1 -0.746   -0.988* -1.216** -1.699*** 
 (0.522)   (0.516) (0.557) (0.495) 
Management quality:        
Inefficiency t-1  0.038**  0.029* 0.087*** 0.023 
  (0.015)  (0.016) (0.027) (0.023) 
NIM t-1  -0.750*  -0.835* -0.682** -1.000* 
  (0.459)  (0.443) (0.280) (0.559) 
Market monitoring:        
Big 4 auditor t-1   0.805 0.824 -0.531 0.834 
   (0.628) (0.611) (1.003) (0.850) 
Credit rating t-1   -1.114 -1.231 -2.424 -1.621 
   (1.001) (0.998) (1.434) (1.215) 
Public listing t-1   2.234** 2.513** -0.316 3.649** 
   (0.991) (0.995) (1.840) (1.349) 
Macro-level factors:         
Economic growth t       -0.749*** 
      (0.120) 
Financial development t       -2.958*** 
      (0.737) 
Control variables:       
Capitalization  t-1 -0.394*** -0.310** -0.376** -0.339** -0.288*** -0.374** 
 (0.139) (0.149) (0.146) (0.154) (0.095) (0.139) 
Loans / Assets t-1 0.027 0.032 0.030 0.031 -0.026 -0.007 
 (0.051) (0.050) (0.049) (0.052) (0.067) (0.064) 
Directed loans t-1 -0.107 -0.146* -0.115 -0.073 -0.038 -0.055 
 (0.070) (0.080) (0.077) (0.083) (0.063) (0.110) 
Loan growth rate t -0.050* -0.051* -0.042 -0.050* -0.110*** -0.048 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.033) (0.038) 
Bank size t-1 5.637*** 5.826*** 5.801*** 4.756*** 4.405*** 4.480** 
 (1.506) (1.495) (1.580) (1.631) (0.909) (1.898) 
New bank t -3.696 -4.251** -1.555 -3.669* -4.817* -2.246 
 (2.276) (2.139) (2.117) (2.053) (2.436) (2.034) 
CR3 t 0.569*** 0.598*** 0.589*** 0.454*** 0.324** 0.160 
 (0.109) (0.108) (0.116) (0.122) (0.133) (0.132) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Constant  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 301 301 301 301 301 301 






Table 7. Regression results:  Determinants of the Old NPL ratio in Bangladesh banks.  
 
The table reports estimation results for the determinants of the  Old  NPL ratio in an unbalanced panel of 26 
banks in Bangladesh over the 2000 – 2012 period.  Definitions of variables are provided in Table 2. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% .  
 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable:  Old NPL ratio t 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Internal governance:        
Founders-controlled bank t-1 -1.246   -0.556 -1.487 -0.294 
 (0.885)   (0.887) (1.177) (1.495) 
Institutional ownership t-1 -0.046   -0.075* -0.090* -0.063 
 (0.042)   (0.041) (0.051) (0.053) 
Board independence t-1 0.033   0.045 -0.006 0.054 
 (0.037)   (0.038) (0.037) (0.068) 
Audit committee activity t-1 -0.627   -0.864* -1.136** -1.414*** 
 (0.484)   (0.470) (0.516) (0.446) 
Management quality:        
Inefficiency t-1  0.035***  0.027* 0.081*** 0.016 
  (0.013)  (0.014) (0.025) (0.022) 
NIM t-1  -0.994**  -1.144*** -0.722*** -1.401*** 
  (0.452)  (0.418) (0.248) (0.480) 
Market monitoring:        
Big 4 auditor t-1   0.877 0.877* -0.573 0.861 
   (0.547) (0.514) (0.918) (0.724) 
Credit rating t-1   -0.679 -0.812 -2.158 -1.345 
   (0.928) (0.896) (1.410) (1.113) 
Public listing t-1   2.205** 2.402** 0.285 3.875*** 
   (0.941) (0.952) (1.770) (1.354) 
Macro-level factors:         
Economic growth t       -0.676*** 
      (0.123) 
Financial development t       -2.641*** 
      (0.684) 
Control variables:       
Capitalization  t-1 -0.316*** -0.236* -0.312*** -0.249** -0.293** -0.302*** 
 (0.114) (0.121) (0.117) (0.117) (0.112) (0.094) 
Loans / Assets t-1 0.032 0.042 0.034 0.039 -0.022 0.013 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.064) (0.062) 
Directed loans t-1 -0.040 -0.069 -0.044 0.001 -0.046 0.018 
 (0.059) (0.073) (0.065) (0.074) (0.062) (0.095) 
Loan growth rate t -0.046** -0.047** -0.039 -0.046** -0.103*** -0.040 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.030) (0.033) 
Bank size t-1 5.106*** 4.974*** 5.197*** 3.944*** 3.724*** 3.210* 
 (1.358) (1.331) (1.425) (1.446) (0.855) (1.674) 
New bank t -2.870 -3.657* -0.847 -3.205* -4.028* -1.827 
 (2.069) (1.903) (1.917) (1.860) (2.281) (1.805) 
CR3 t 0.572*** 0.573*** 0.598*** 0.453*** 0.312** 0.150 
 (0.095) (0.091) (0.104) (0.111) (0.129) (0.119) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Constant  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 301 301 301 301 301 301 





Table 8. Regression results:  Determinants of the Net NPL ratio in Bangladesh banks.  
 
The table reports estimation results for the determinants of  the  Net  NPL ratio in an unbalanced panel of 26 
banks in Bangladesh over the 2000 – 2012 period.  Definitions of variables are provided in Table 2. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% .  
 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable:  Net NPL ratio t 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Internal governance:        
Founders-controlled bank t-1 -1.966***   -1.108* -1.043 -0.824 
 (0.610)   (0.634) (0.831) (1.095) 
Institutional ownership t-1 -0.012   -0.028 -0.050 -0.016 
 (0.033)   (0.031) (0.044) (0.039) 
Board independence t-1 -0.007   0.006 0.024 0.018 
 (0.032)   (0.031) (0.032) (0.053) 
Audit committee activity t-1 -0.510   -0.663 -0.914* -1.350*** 
 (0.442)   (0.438) (0.515) (0.364) 
Management quality:        
Inefficiency t-1  0.042***  0.037** 0.078*** 0.028 
  (0.014)  (0.015) (0.024) (0.023) 
NIM t-1  -1.030***  -1.041*** -0.928*** -1.406*** 
  (0.304)  (0.312) (0.306) (0.398) 
Market monitoring:        
Big 4 auditor t-1   0.534 0.534 -0.860 0.399 
   (0.491) (0.452) (0.714) (0.624) 
Credit rating t-1   -0.867 -0.916 -1.868** -1.522** 
   (0.798) (0.762) (0.738) (0.676) 
Public listing t-1   0.946 0.720 0.396 1.916** 
   (0.832) (0.710) (1.416) (0.849) 
Macro-level factors:         
Economic growth t       -0.710*** 
      (0.108) 
Financial development t       -2.180*** 
      (0.629) 
Control variables:       
Capitalization  t-1 -0.070 0.036 -0.037 0.019 -0.097 -0.072 
 (0.122) (0.136) (0.127) (0.143) (0.080) (0.122) 
Loans / Assets t-1 0.110** 0.115*** 0.110** 0.115*** 0.026 0.100** 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.043) (0.057) (0.048) 
Directed loans t-1 0.100** 0.075 0.095* 0.117** -0.028 0.129** 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.049) (0.055) (0.052) (0.050) 
Loan growth rate t 0.015 0.012 0.020 0.010 -0.057** 0.012 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.026) (0.017) 
Bank size t-1 7.588*** 7.467*** 7.912*** 6.921*** 3.950*** 5.370*** 
 (1.069) (1.027) (1.176) (1.102) (0.623) (0.834) 
New bank t -0.060 -1.191 1.198 -1.150 -3.008* -0.975 
 (1.612) (1.478) (1.628) (1.481) (1.536) (1.409) 
CR3 t 0.728*** 0.720*** 0.745*** 0.632*** 0.327*** 0.011 
 (0.081) (0.075) (0.092) (0.084) (0.087) (0.090) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Constant  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 301 301 301 301 301 301 




Table 9. Additional results:  Allowing for delayed effect of the bank governance characteristics on the 
NPL resolution process.    
 
In this table we extend our regression results in Tables 7 and 8 by allowing a more slow adjustment of the three 
alternative NPL ratios to bank governance characteristics.  Except deeper (two-year) lags for the Internal 
Governance proxies,  all reported regressions replicate Model 4 in Tables 7 and 8, i.e. include bank and time 
fixed effects and the full set of  the management quality, market monitoring and  bank-level control variables.  
The number of usable bank-year observations is 275. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;  ***, 
** and * denote the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable:   
Gross NPL ratio t Old NPL ratio t Net NPL ratio t 
Internal governance:     
Founders-controlled bank t-2 -1.380* -1.159* -1.107* 
 (0.580) (0.574) (0.587) 
Institutional ownership t-2 -0.063 -0.053 -0.018 
 (0.048) (0.045) (0.032) 
Board independence t-2 0.004 0.027 -0.013 
 (0.041) (0.035) (0.031) 
Audit committee activity t-2 -1.203* -1.115** -1.001** 
 (0.639) (0.561) (0.487) 
Management quality variables Yes Yes Yes 
Market monitoring variables  Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 275 275 275 




Table 10. Summary of results: Governance, management quality and private monitoring 




Mandated by the regulation? Empirical findings 
 
Internal governance:  
Founders-
controlled bank   
Yes, directly, by enforcing 
banks to sell shares to the 
general public and by 
restricting the ownership 
stake to closely confined 
founding private owners.   
Concentrated (founders-controlled) bank ownership is 
associated with lower levels of NPLs. However, this 
relationship is not robust and, based on the descriptive 
results, seems to dominate at the early stage of the 
banking sector reform, when other corporate 
governance mechanisms are not in place yet.  
Institutional 
ownership  
No; banks can have any 
proportion of institutional 
and/or foreign investors in 
their ownership structure.  
Following the increase in the institutional and/or 
foreign ownership in a bank may not be strongly 
associated with the decrease in the ratio of NPL loans.  
Board 
independence   
Yes, directly by the capped 
number of directors (max 
13), restrictions on the 
number of directors from a 
single family and 
introduction of depositor 
directors.  
Although board independence has visibly improved 
during the study period in Bangladeshi banks, this 
advancement in bank governance characteristics are 
insignificantly associated with the NPL resolution.  
Audit committee 
activity  
Yes, directly by prescribing 
the committee’s 
composition, 
responsibilities,  and 
disclosure standards   
Internal audit committee activity seems to have the 
most robust and consistent effect among all internal 
governance mechanisms in resolving NPLs. The 
strength of this factor also seems to increase with time, 
once we allow more delayed effects with a deeper lags 
structure.  
 
Management quality:  
Inefficiency   Yes, indirectly by CEO 
qualification requirements 
As a bank’s operating inefficiency decreases by 10%, 
the NPL ratio in a follow-up period also drops by 
about 0.56% (on an average). This effect is robust 
across almost all model specifications.  
NIM Yes, indirectly by CEO 
qualifications requirements 
and enforcement to expedite 
NPL write-offs from the last 
period’s net profit  
As the bank’s core operating profitability increases, 
all NPL ratios tend to drop. Across all model 
specifications, this result is economically and 
statistically strong and suggests about 1.01% (on an 
average) decrease in the NPL ratios following a 1% 
increase in the bank’s NIM.  
 















Big 4 auditor Yes, indirectly; the 
auditors are annually 
ranked by BB and banks 
should select an auditor 
from the approved list.  
Although sample banks tend to flip their external 
auditors quite often during the sample period, the use 
of the reputable, Big4-affiliated, auditor is not 
significantly associated with the reduction of the NPL.   
Credit rating Yes, but only in the most 
recent period.  
Following the assignment of a credit ratings, banks 
tend to reduce their NPL ratio by about 1.5% in the 
follow-up period.   
Public listing Yes; strong regulatory 
pressure and enforcement 
to convert private and 
government-owned banks 
to the publicly listed 
corporations.  
Following the public listing, banks tend to increase 
their NPL ratios by a sizeable 2.5%. However, this 
result is highly sensitive to the model specification and 
requires further investigation. We expect a complex 
interplay and potential trade-offs between increased 
transparency, lower ownership concentration and less 
incentives for the pre-listing window-dressing 
following the bank listing on the local exchange.  
 
Other key factors:  
  
Capitalization Yes, through enforcing 
banks to maintain 
adequate capital ratios 
Gradual increase in bank capital ratio is associated with 
the reduction of the total and old NPL in its portfolio. 
For uncovered NPLs’ ratio, i.e. NPLs adjusted for 
accumulated loan loss reserves, we do not detect any 




NA Robust economic growth is associated with reduction 
of bad loan ratios in a developing banking sector. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
